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Contractualism is a normative theory of ethics that posits that what an individual ought or ought 
not do arises from an antecedent (or prior) moral agreement, deliberation, or acknowledgement. 
The nature of this agreement, as in its conditions, such as the nature of the persons involved, the 
circumstances of the agreeing process, and the constraints on the process should produce the 
resulting deliberative and normative morality. In this paper I will explore the “constraint 
critique” of contractualism. First I will explore the necessary tenets of contractualism and why 
any constraints are necessary. Second, I will explain why contractualist agreements cannot 
necessarily possess ‘moral constraints’ where otherwise such constraints would lead to an 
infinite moral regress. For any ethical theory is incoherent if any moral entities exist prior to the 
process that purportedly is the genesis of all morality. Finally, I will explain that irrespective of 
‘moral constraints’ a contractualist agreement is still tenable while possessing ‘non-moral’ 
rational constraints. Using contemporary ethical analysis, game theory, and discussions from 
famed moral philosopher David Gauthier I will argue that rational constraints are necessary to 
encourage, incentivize, and confine an agreement between competing agents in a “natural” 
condition of scarcity and competition. Thus the “constraint critique” is not a tenable argument 
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Contractualism is a normative theory of ethics that posits that what an individual ought or ought 
not do arises from an antecedent moral agreement, deliberation, or acknowledgement. The nature 
of this agreement, as in its conditions, such as the nature of the persons involved, the 
circumstances of the agreeing process, and the constraints on the agreement process produce the 
resulting deliberative and normative morality.1 In this paper I will explore the “constraint” 
critique of contractualism. First I will explore the necessary tenets of contractualism and why 
any constraints are necessary. Second, I will explain why contractualist agreements cannot 
necessarily possess ‘moral constraints’ where otherwise such constraints would lead to an 
infinite moral regress. Any ethical theory is incoherent if any moral entities exist prior to the 
process that purportedly is the genesis of all morality. Finally, I will explain that irrespective of 
‘moral constraints’ a contractualist agreement is still tenable while possessing ‘non-moral’ 
rational constraints. Using contemporary ethical analysis in game theory in conjunction with 
famed moral philosopher David Gauthier I will argue that rational constraints are necessary to 
encourage, incentivize, and confine an agreement between competing agents in a “natural” 
condition of scarcity and competition. Thus the “constraint critique” is not a tenable argument 
against contractualism whereas the theory allows for rational constraints.  
Contractualism doesn’t necessarily espouse a literal agreement that would take place in some 
smoke filled room but rather entails hypothetical agents, hypothetical agreements, and 
hypothetical realms. Contractualists would have us picture agents engaging in some variably 
deliberative process to the “end of establishing standards (not practices) in light of which they 
                                                 
1
 I will conflate agreement, agreeing, agreement process, deliberative process and deliberation from this 
point forward. They will all refer to the same process that is required of contractualism. I will pivot 
between word choice to reduce redundancy at the expense of some temporary confusion.  
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may assess their practices and institutions and thus enable themselves to attempt reform where 
necessary.”2 To consolidate Norman Care’s construction of contractualism:  
1) When persons are of a certain nature (P),  
2) and their circumstances are of a certain kind (C),  
3) and they accept (or have imposed on them) a certain deliberating-procedure (D-M),  
4) these persons will acknowledge, i.e., moral principles of a certain type, e.g., (J1) and 
(J2).3 
Understandably, the burden of a tenable contractualist theory from the likes of T.M. Scanlon, 
John Rawls, or even Thomas Hobbes requires us to first answer a further antecedent question. 
While moral standards or principles are the intended result of this deliberative agreement it 
remains essential to first analyze how the “persons in question structure their deliberations”4 to 
begin with (As indicated by D-M above). The antecedent nature of contractualism is haunted by 
a further antecedent.  
John Rawls describes this ‘haunting’ antecedent tenet of contractualism (D-M) as 
“expressing the constraints of morality.” Other contractualists in contention here like Scanlon, 
Hobbes, or Gauthier refer to these expressive constraints amongst others as deliberative-
procedures, conditions, and just generally ‘constraints.’ All contractualists have some kind of 
constraint on the deliberative or agreeing process. If the constraints are both antecedent and also 
necessary to the deliberative process then they remain a preliminary lynchpin to any 
contractualist position. Any condition that is both antecedent and necessary for an object or event 
is burdened by this same lynchpin status.   Critics of the contractualist position could refute the 
“constraint” problem two-fold: 1) Functionally indict the ability of agents to ever agree on 
                                                 
2
 Care, Norman S. "Contractualism and Moral Criticism." The Review of Metaphysics (1969):  87 
3
 Ibid 2., p 86 
4
 Ibid  
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“constraints” or 2) Indict the content and nature of constraints as ethically inconsistent or 
untenable. The former refutation inevitably invites discussion on the feasibility of hypothetical 
agreement processes and ideal agents at all. This argument tends to quickly devolve into 
conversations of social science, sociology, and social psychology over concerns of ethics and 
metaethics. Like more reasonable critics I choose to explore the latter refutation.   
Lauded moral realist Russ Shafer-Landau (RSL) and ethicist Norman S. Care chose to 
engage a specific damning argument against these antecedent and necessary constraints that are 
‘moral’ in nature. I will succinctly reconstruct this argument between the two of them. In 
particular, RSL and Care attack the ‘moral’ constraints of Scanlon and Rawls. Cynthia Stark 
labels the contractualist theories of Scanlon and Rawls as “morally constrained” because these 
constraints are derived from some proscribed “moral-motivation” or value-judgment.5 For 
example, Scanlon places ‘constraints’ on hypothetical agents by attributing an “explicit moral 
motivation” to the “choosers and specifies under conditions [of agreement where this should] 
preclude coercion.”6 Scanlon equally posits that the conditions to the agreeing process and the 
reasoning internal to process must based in values of mutual recognition.  
If the real “reason-giving force” of contractualist moralities thus can be “traced” from the 
value of mutual recognition “then processes of motivating reflection that exclude this distinctive 
value and feature instead such specific moral categories as fairness, danger, harm, and cruelty 
look like forms of false consciousness.”7 Contractualist morality can “applaud” constraints that 
condemn or condone such aforementioned values “but in doing so it starts to resemble those 
unstable and artificially compartmentalized forms of indirect consequentialism.” If Scanlon is 
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 Wallace, R. Jay. "Scanlon’s Contractualism." Ethics 112, no. 3 (2002): 456 
  Narrow Bridges and Rational Constraints 
6 
 
espousing constraints that maximize “mutual recognition” and minimize coercion then Scanlon 
is constructing a value-judgment. Scanlon is necessarily implying that an individual ought not be 
coercive in an agreement process and ought mutually recognize others in the same deliberative 
process that intends to derive or create moral standards and principles. Scanlon’s constraints are 
explicitly moral in nature. Scanlon is a shadow of Rawls’ own moral constraints.  
Rawlsian “moral constraints” rely heavily on positing a “moral motivation” of equality 
and fairness. Rawls’ constraints follow:  
1) The standards any one of them proposes for mutual acceptance by all be thought of as 
applicable to all, including the proposer. 
2) The standards be accepted by all as binding forever (and hence on their children as 
well as themselves). 
3) That the standards be proposed from behind a "veil of ignorance" respecting the 
proposer's personal needs, interests, social station, etc.8  
While Rawls is referring in constraints (1) and (2) to the proceeding deliberative reasoning more 
than the initial constraints of the process both (1) and (2) place some determinable constraint of 
equality and fairness.  (1) constrains the agreement by requiring all agents to universalize and 
generalize their future proposals. (2) constrains the agreement by requiring agents to offer 
unconditional and infinitely-binding moral standards and principles.  (3) explicitly and clearly 
constrains the agreement process to blind fairness. The agreement is constrained through the 
placement of the now infamous “veil of ignorance.” Rawls is positing value judgments on how 
ought the agreements and their consequent moral standards be made. The agreement process 
ought be universal, general, unconditional, binding, equal, and fair.  
                                                 
8
 Ibid 3 




These moral constraints should produce moral agreements and eventually moral 
standards that are also universal, general, binding, equal, and fair. Evidently Rawls and Scanlon 
impose explicit value judgment in their ‘moral constraints.’ RSL strongly argues that if 
contractualists “import moral constraints” then “they effectively abandon [contractualism]” 
because they existence of “moral constraints that are conceptually and explanatorily prior [or 
antecedent] to the agents doing the construction” means that the offered ‘moral constraints’ are 
not the products of deliberation, agreement, or construction.9  
The prior “moral motivations” or value-judgments that maintain moral constraints for 
both Rawls and Scanlon suggest “there would be moral facts or reasons that obtain 
independently of [contractualist] functions.”10 If moral facts, moral standards, or value-
judgments can be derived independent of contractualist functions then morality cannot be solely 
contingent on contractualist functions. The argument follows: 
P1: Contractualism constructs moral standards and principles from a deliberative process 
with particular persons, circumstances, and constraints.  
P2: Contractualism supposes the presence of certain moral constraints in the antecedent 
of time (T). 
P3: Moral constraints require justification via value-judgments, moral standards, “moral 
motivations” or moral principles. (Mutual recognition, fairness, equality). 
C1: There are value-judgments, moral standards, or moral principles that are antecedent 
to the deliberative process. 
                                                 
9
 Shafer-Landau, Russ. "Moral realism: A defence." (2003): 42 
10
 Ibid 
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C2: Value judgments, moral standards, and moral principles cannot be contingent on a 
deliberative process.  
Contractualism is perceivably “limited when viewed as a normative theory” of ethics 
“insofar as it cannot itself specify what are the constraints of morality or provide an account of 
their acceptance or possession” when they are dependent on prior value-judgments, “moral 
motivations,” moral standards or moral principles.11 Norman S. Care writes poignantly that the 
“central idea of contractualism is lost” when:  
…[T]he  move from antecedent conditions to acceptance of principles is logically 
automatic in this way, and the antecedent conditions themselves include the presence of 
moral constraints, then (T) becomes an elaborate device for expressing views about the 
nature of morality that are logically prior to it. The theory itself thus becomes 
uninstructive with respect to the nature of morality and the justification of moral 
criticisms of practices and institutions.12 
By virtue of constraining the agreement process to a deliberation that is fair, equal, or mutually 
recognizing Scanlon and Rawls concede that there are some logically prior moralities to their 
moral agreements and their respective processes. At this point even if Scanlon and Rawls 
conceded that there was some prior agreement to agree on the morality of the ‘moral constraints’ 
(absurd as it sounds) then this would create an infinite moral regress. There would need be an 
infinite number of moral agreements to satisfy both preceding and proceeding constraints. Even 
the simple semantic phrasing of Scanlon and Rawls that suggests that the moral agreement 
process require ‘moral constraints’ is itself necessarily an infinite regress. If morality is the 
product of the process then it cannot be used as a constraining tool to the same process.  
                                                 
11
 Ibid 2., p. 97 
12
 Ibid 2., p. 101 
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Contractualists must abandon ‘moral constraints.’ At the point contractualists abandon ‘moral 
constraints’ it is  necessary to probe the possibility of ‘non-moral constraints.’ Despite staunch 
and quick dismissal of contractaulism RSL does concede that there could be a workable non-
moral constraint but that the existing contractualists have left him unconvinced on that front.13 At 
this stage ‘non-moral’ constraints are not logically precluded from a possible deliberative and 
agreeing process.   
 Contractualists Thomas Hobbes and David Gauthier do not include moral standards, 
moral elements, or “moral-motivations” in their idealizations of deliberative constraints.  Cynthia 
Stark labels Hobbes and Gauthier agreements as “morally unconstrained” but this is a misstep.14 
While Hobbes and Gauthier propose a deliberative process that is technically “morally 
unconstrained” it would be more apt to suggest the agreement possesses ‘non-moral constraints.’ 
Gauthier argues qua Hobbes that there are in fact tenable rational constraints on moral 
agreements. These rational constraints exist as such that the constraints are not derived from any 
prior moralities but a rational necessity that facilitates the agreement itself.  
To examine how rational constraints can and are part of a moral agreement process I will 
an example from the classics. In Book XII of the Iliad, Achilles calls for a heroic chariot race to 
honor the death of Patroclus. As the race intensifies the ever-glistening Antilochus, one of five 
entrants, attempts to overtake Menelaus. A “narrow” bridge or place had formed in the track 
where only a single chariot could functionally pass. As Menelaus approached the bridge 
Antilochus raced up to his side. Menelaus called out: “Antilochus, thou art driving 
recklessly…rein in thy horses! Here is the way straitened, but presently it will be wider for 
passing; lest haply thou work harm to us both by fouling my car." Antilochus forges on causing 
                                                 
13
 Ibid 9 
14
 Ibid 5,. p. 315 
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Menelaus, who was originally in front of him, to pull back and in the resulting events take third 
to Antilochus’s disputed second place.15 Moral theorist Malcolm Murray characterizes a 
competitive event like this as the Narrow Bridge Game.16 The Narrow Bridge Game assumes an 
abstracted scenario where two chariots or two cars both approach a narrow space. How ought the 
two chariots or two cares proceed? How can we even begin to decide an appropriate outcome for 
the Narrow Bridge Game without an appropriate process?  
Only one chariot can pass or disaster will ensue when both chariots simultaneously enter. 
If neither chariot passes each other then both will ostensibly lose. Both can’t speed and both 
can’t wait. The Narrow Bridge Game necessarily requires a choice or competitive allocation 
between one chariot over another. Maybe one chariot will have to wait and one will have to 
speed ahead. A seemingly non-arbitrary and objective solution could first in and first out. Time 
in this case could be an intuitively objective measuring stick.  Despite reaching the Narrow 
Bridge second Antilochus dangerously cut off Menelaus. No matter the eventual agreed 
outcome, like first in and first out, the decision and resulting behavior of the chariots would 
require a previous agreement on behalf of the two or all racers.  
The race serves as a theoretical representation of the agreement process and its fruition to 
moral deliberative. A contractualist argument for establishing what ought one do or ought not do 
is based on an agreement between rational individuals in constant competition like the Narrow 
Bridge. Hobbes argues that this “rational bargain” has to occur to deter, diminish, and squelch 
the “natural condition of War”17or what I will call simply here as competition. There is a “natural 
condition” of competition. The “natural condition” of War or competition is derived from an 
                                                 
15
 Gagarin, Michael. "Antilochus' Strategy: The Chariot Race in Iliad 23.” Classical Philology 78, no. 1 
(1983): 35-39 
16
 Murray, Malcolm, ed. The moral wager: evolution and contract. Vol. 108. Springer, 2007: p. 117 
17
 Gauthier, David P. Morals by agreement. Oxford University Press, 1986: p.114 
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existing inherent scarcity. Imagine scarcity in context of the bridge. In relation to the space on 
the bridge and the placement of the racers there is a fixed and finite resource that is accessible by 
a group of racers. That resource receives the status “scare” at the point in which full possession 
of that resource can only be possessed by one agent. 1st place can only be fully possessed by one 
chariot. The space on the bridge can only be fully possessed by one chariot. There is a fixed 
space and finite placement ability between 1st, 2nd, 3rd etc. This is natural to the race and the 
Narrow Bridge. Generalizing the Narrow Bridge would suggest that agents always perceive 
others in some “least potential” of competition “for the goods that he needs for survival or for 
well-being.”18  
This “natural” and endemic problem of competition instills a preference whereas an 
individual might prefer to dominate preemptively so as to gain early in this battle or race of 
scarcity. In a system conditioned by both scarcity and competition an agent would most likely 
prefer to dominate regardless of a zero-sum game. In a zero-sum game all agents would prefer to 
dominate. This preference is necessarily instilled in all agents who are facing a scare resource 
amongst other agents. Coupling a preference to dominate and ‘win’ the competition of scarcity 
would correspondingly lead to a “natural condition” of “War” if not at least a propensity for 
escalation to violence.  Preemption on all parties, asymmetry amongst competing agents, and any 
level of human error could reasonably and inevitably lead and trigger more severe forms of 
escalation and violence. To mitigate this “natural condition of War” and competition Hobbes 
argues that some “Article of Peace” or moral agreement must be made. “Articles of Peace” are 
our constrained agreements that avoid or mitigate “War” and escalation from competition. 
“Articles of Peace” are constrained agreements that avoid Narrow Bridge crashes. The 
                                                 
18
 Ibid 
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antecedent question that haunted Rawls and Scanlon persists for Gauthier and Hobbes. What is 
the genesis and nature of (what I will label) rational constraints on the “Articles of Peace?”  
Rational constraints on “Articles of Peace” are literally intended ensure ‘Peace’. Rational 
constraints ensure that the literally agreeing and agreement process in the “Articles of Peace” 
will take place to begin with. In a “natural condition” of War and competition amongst possibly 
zero-sum game agents why would any person consent to constrain themselves to such a process 
of ‘Peace’?  
Moral agreements are ultimately derived from what David Gauthier posits as those 
agreements that are “fully voluntary” and ex ante (before the event).19 The choice cannot be a 
parametric choice. Meaning if there are other agents involved, or in the case of the Iliad other 
chariots in competition, the choice does not and cannot revolve around the single interests of one 
agent. Individual (A) doesn’t exclusively dictate the rules to the deliberative process that would 
in some means resolve the competitive scarcity over the proverbial resource be it food, money, 
or how to pass in the space of the Narrow Bridge. The choice shifts from parametric to universal 
strategic constraint so that the agent’s “behavior” is “but one variable among others” and thus 
“his choice must be responsive to the expectations of other’s choices, while their choices are 
similarly responsive to their expectations [I.e. ex ante].”20  
This voluntary and ex ante agreement would require cooperation or other voluntary 
cooperative parties. In this sense K. Baeir writes “the very raison d'être of a morality is to yield 
reasons which overrule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone's following self-
interest would be harmful to everyone.”21 Yielding to others in a competitive scarce state 
requires acknowledgment of voluntary, ex ante, and cooperative agreement constraints. If the 
                                                 
19
 Ibid 16, p. 9 
20
 Ibid 16, p. 21 
21
 K. Baier , The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics ( Ithaca, NY, 1958): 309  
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agreement process was not constrained to the voluntary and ex ante then other agents could not 
be expected to do the same. For example, if Antilochus was compelled to enter the agreement or 
did not consent to certain ex ante constraints in agreeing to the division of Narrow Bridge space 
prior to the pass then Menelaus would not expect any norm or moral standard to hold him to. 
 Menelaus would not expect Antilochus or any other competitor to agree to a proper or 
normative chariot maneuver at the bridge whereas in the original agreement process some of the 
competitors were coerced, did not agree to any or ex ante constraints, or there was no agreement 
to begin with. If there had been no constraints or no agreement at all then Antilochus would have 
preferred domination and maximized his own optimal outcome regardless of the other racers and 
agents. Menelaus could safely assume Antilochus would always cut ahead at the bridge whereas 
no constrained agreement or no agreement at all had occurred. Given this possible scenario of 
domination and the remaining scarcity of the space at the bridge Menelaus could likely predict 
that Antilochus would dangerously cut ahead. To which he did in the Iliad. Given plausible 
racing scenarios Menelaus could 1) pull back to minimize harm potential to both parties (To 
which he did in the Iliad) or 2) take advantage of the danger now present and maximize the harm 
potential to the opposing racer.  Rational constraints prevent Narrow Bridge crashes.  In the 
original story Menelaus had assumed in his strategic choice that Antilochus would willingly and 
preemptively let the first driver at the Narrow Bridge into the fixed space. Menelaus was too was 
expected to allow the first driver be it himself or any other chariot. The expectation of first in and 
first out most likely came from an unspoken agreement between racers that entailed regardless of 
each respective racer’s intent to win that all drivers would be willing to let safety supersede 
speed at certain points.  
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 Menelaus is a ‘rational’ agent in this case because he assumingly internalized and 
affirmed the constraint to his own optimal outcomes in the effort to promote mutual benefit and 
safety to himself.  If however, all agents engage in the Narrow Bridge Game like Antilochus then 
from this point out there is no reason to enter the agreement process whatsoever. Pulling on 
tenets of mutually assured destruction and game theory, rational constraints are mechanisms and 
means to assure that the “Articles of Peace” take place to begin with. Otherwise Narrow Bridges 
Games have no meaning or order in relation to their competing chariots. This is not to suggest a 
normative moral telos that desires ‘Peace.’ The “Articles of Peace” cannot be expected to occur 
if there are not rational constraints that incentivize the joining of the ‘Peace’ process itself.  
This antecedent rational constraint is bound of course in rational faculties. Gauthier and 
Hobbes would have that ‘I ought constrain my optimal choices in an agreeing process and that ‘I 
ought’ equally allow others to participate in process by constraining my own time. That I applies 
to all agreeing agents. A rational constraint on an agreement might require all agents to consent 
to some minimization of their optimal choices in the agreeing process. A rational constraint on 
an agreement might require all agents to consent to abdication of time for personal advocacy that 
would ensure equal time for all. These constraints are not necessary to the process because of 
some “moral motivation” that compels that process but because said constraints on myself AND 
others would incentivize individuals in a possibly zero-sum “natural condition” of War to engage 
in the agreeing process.  This use of ought is no different than positing that “I ought turn on the 
car to pull out of the drive way.” In this fashion the ought becomes at most a logically 
conditional tool that espouses no normative morality. The counterfactual facing these agents, an 
unconstrained and unagreeing world of ‘War’, is a world of preemptive dominating engagement 
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(look to Antilochus) where ‘might is right’ would most likely prevail and duly crush weaker 
competitors.   
That counterfactual world is not morally ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’. To concede that the 
counterfactual world is not “preferable” would indict the analysis above. This is a problem that 
could potentially plague Hobbes and Gauthier.  In Gauthier and Hobbes’ “natural” rhetorical 
dichotomy there may seem an antecedent moral presumption that ‘Peace’ is preferable to ‘War.’ 
If rational constraints were placed on agreeing processes to avoid the horrors of ‘War’ and 
conversely maximize the blessings of ‘Peace’ then this constraint justification would be no better 
than ‘moral constraints’ founded in some utilitarian framework. To save “rational” constraints 
from these antecedent moral presumptions Gauthier and Hobbes would need to successfully 
argue that there is a “non-moral” reason to prefer ‘Peace’ over ‘War’.  The plausible argument 
and resulting answer against this problem of “non-moral” reasons relies on the descriptive 
elements of Gauthier and Hobbes’ contractualism: 22  
------ 
P1: Scarcity is an inherent condition of a co-occupied world.23  
 P2: Societal occupants are rational beings.  
 P3: Scarcity demands competition between rational beings.24  
C1: There are scarcity-competitions in a co-occupied world. 
 
                                                 
22
 This descriptive argument does not rely on empirically verifiable observations that would be required of 
a sociologist or social psychologist. Game theory in similar fashion assumes specific and self-evident 
parameters while predicting abstract behavior based and internal to those original parameters.  
23
 (P1) A fixed set of resources are “inherently” scare at the point of 2+ persons 
24
 (P3) Antilochus and Menelaus faced a “scarce” space being that of the bridge. Rational beings know 
that full and equal access of a scare resource is mutually exclusive. The “scarce” source now must be 
divided in some way or given to one agent as a whole. No matter the structure of the competition, 
competition results nonetheless.  
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P4: Asymmetrical scarcity-competitions are plausible and possible.  
P5: By definition, asymmetrical competition favors scarcity victories for a few 
over many.25 
C2: Asymmetrical scarcity-competitions do not benefit a majority of 
‘competitors.’ 
------ 
P7: Asymmetrical scarcity-competitions are more plausible and more possible in a 
society necessarily lacking morality.26 
C3: At the point asymmetrical scarcity-competitions are more possible and that 
statistically they favor a few chanced competitors, a rational competitor ought at 
least prefer symmetrical competition or ‘peace’ful resolution.27  
----- 
 The “natural” condition of ‘War’ is contingent on scarcity-competition and the 
perceptions of the competitors qua competitors. To absolve the sins of chanced asymmetrical 
force and the resulting escalation there need be ‘Peace’ agreements. A rational individual ought 
prefer ‘Peace’ agreements and thus ‘Peace’ so as to maximize their potential competitive status. 
Maximizing potential competitive status requires rational constraints.  The counterfactual or 
alternative permits or increases the possibility of a world in which asymmetrical forces would 
probably or be likely to undermine a given random competitor’s competitive status. I ought 
                                                 
25(P5) If a competition is asymmetrical then there would be some monopoly of force or violence favoring 
a few that would disproportionally receive scare resources due to their monopoly. 
26
 (P7) Remember that prior to the contractualist agreement there are no morals and most likely no rules 
or laws (Assuming one legal theory there is a non-separability between morality and the law). Pure 
chance suggests that some individuals will have stronger physical or mental faculties. Arbitrarily the 
competition would favor ‘might is right’ seeing as there are no legal or moral ways to resolving 
competing co-occupants.  
27
 (C2, P7)  
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prefer ‘Peace’ over ‘War’ because I am a rational competitor. As a rational competitor in 
competition with other rational competitors I ought make ‘Peace’ agreements that would 
facilitate ‘Peace’ and mitigate ‘War.’ I am a rational competitor and ought place constraints on 
the agreeing parties, including myself, so as to ensure that others will participate in the ‘Peace’ 
agreement.  
An agent or chariot racer may be rational in the constraints of a moral agreement at the 
point in which they accept and expect others to constrain their optimal choices while 
simultaneously constraining their own optimal choice matrix. Regardless if the constraints look 
like the ones above or in some similar form these constraints are justified in rational faculties and 
not in the depths of infinite moral regress. Constraints on agreeing processes are not justified by 
value-judgments, “moral motivations,” or moral standards but must be derived from a rational 
pursuit. In natural scarcity-competitions agents would otherwise not participate in a ‘Peace’ 
agreement unless there were rational constraints on all agents involved. Rational constraints 
facilitate and incentivize the agreement process to which creates moral agreement and 
consequently prevents Narrow Bridge crashes.  Contractualism allows for tenable and non-moral 
rational constraints.  
